Structured negotiation is proposed as a new method through which collaborating agents can seek consensus on the apportionment of tasks and resources. The approach draws on research in collaborative planning and human dialog understanding: agent i n teractions are organized in a manner that re ects the structure of a shared plan. Negotiations are incremental and interleaved with the shared planning process while communications supporting negotiations are made e cient b y d r a wing on knowledge of a prevailing context. Agent proposals to team members are annotated with causal information that compactly expresses relationships between new proposals and the current c o n text. Normative guidelines for proposal generation further restrict communications of ancillary information to only those fragments that represent departures from the norm. Finally, a set of interpretation rules allows agents to infer information not explicitly communicated.
and resources. A n umber of strategies for negotiation have been put forward in recent y ears some draw o n w ork in game theory while others seek a closer correspondence to the process that occurs between groups of human agents. Most approaches have focussed on negotiation among self-interested agents that is, agents that maximize the expected utility o f outcomes to their actions. This paper introduces a new form of negotiation, termed structured n e gotiation, w h i c h is concerned with the organization of negotiation among arti cial agents in collaborative settings. Negotiation is viewed as a mechanism through which a g e n ts can exchange beliefs and intentions relevant to the collaborative planning process.
In this paper, all agents are assumed to work together as part of a team: as such, they are assumed to share the same utility function and are also assumed to be truthful. Communication is assumed to be costly and, hence, should be limited to valuable information. This last assumption directly motivates the need for negotiation: if agents shared all information, they could, in principle, individually compute optimal strategies for acting.
Given these assumptions, structured negotiation embodies the following principles: (1) communications that support negotiation should be e cient (2) negotiation should be interleaved with planning (3) processing should be incremental and (4) interactions should be organized around evolving plans. Roughly speaking, one communication is more e cient than another if its message length is shorter and both communications result in equivalent transmission of information. Such information-loading is common in natural language dialogs: when an utterance is interpreted within some context, it will usually carry with it additional information not explicitly transmitted. In bandwidth-restricted environments, e ciency is a desirable property.
The process of collaborative planning is one that takes place over some period of time. It is unrealistic to suppose that agents will suspend negotiations until group deliberations are complete similarly, it is unrealistic to suppose that agents can suspend deliberations until they have arrived at a consensus regarding the division of tasks and resources. Negotiations mu s t b e i n terleaved with planning therefore, a communication language for negotiation should be able to refer to elements of a shared plan as well as relations between sub-plans. When negotiation is interleaved with planning, it cannot range over every possible issue or option at once: this would require that agents negotiate over every possible plan an activity that is computationally prohibitive.
One way of realizing incrementality i s b y organizing negotiations so that agents can systematically elaborate their plans while at the same time seeking consensus on the division of resources and tasks. By structuring a negotiation, communications can be restricted to well-de ned elements of a sub-plan. Structured negotiation organizes interactions in terms of task abstraction hierarchies as well as belief and intention dependencies. The former distinguishes this approach with conventional approaches which restrict task negotiation to range only over primitive tasks.
The next section begins by presenting a running example that will be used throughout the paper. A representation for actions and plans as well as a set of causal relations used to indicate relations between actions in sub-plans is then discussed. This leads to an algorithm for structured negotiation and an examination of communications in situ. The paper concludes with a discussion of the savings gained from a structured perspective on negotiation and a comparison with other approaches.
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Consider a futuristic world in which a team of robots is deployed within some area where hostages are being held by terrorists the robots may be tasked with goals of locating objects such as terrorists, guards, hostages, or explosives. Figure 1 illustrates such a scenario taking place in a small area consisting of a series of corridors and rooms. Highlevel directives ow from some central point. In this scenario, robots R1 and R4 are tasked with patrolling corridor 1. They must then negotiate on a method for accomplishing that goal: for example by splitting the e ort equally, o r b y having one of the robots perform the entire task on its own if the other is busy. As the example will illustrate, the robots' beliefs can di er: in particular, R1 is not aware of the other activities of R3 or R4.
Given such a task, consider the sample negotiation shown in Figure 2 between two robots, R1 and R4. R1 is located at the extreme left and R4 is at the extreme right. A third robot, R3 is at the top of the gure while, another robot, R2, is not shown. Corridor 1 is the bottom row, corridor 2 the top row and corridor 3 is the middle column intersecting R3 and corridor 2. Corridor 4 is outside the gure. In this (1) exchange, R1 rst proposes the \normal" division in which the patrol task is divided evenly. Since, all of the agents are on the same team and have the same utility function, R4 interprets this proposal as an indication that R1 is unaware of R4's other commitments: it therefore shares that information with R1 and makes a counter-proposal. R1 is not sure whether R3 can help (in fact, given the shared preferences, it is unsure whether R4 knows whether it can help) this explains exchange (5) . Robot R4 interprets this as a request for information and therefore shares the information in (6) (we can assume that, for example, R3's antenna just went d o wn and R1 cannot communicate with it). Having updated its beliefs in the course of these exchanges, R1 accepts the proposal (7) and R4 con rms this (8) . The embeddings shown re ect the context. For example, message (5) is interpreted as \Can R3 help you with patrol of D so that you can help patrol half of corridor 1 during the times we have discussed, while maintaining your other commitments ?" in which t h e italicized fragment is understood as part of the prevailing context.
Notice that not all negotiation involves task selection: some will involve e x c hanging useful information and establishing beliefs that represent preconditions for actions 10].
REPRESENTATION LANGUAGE
This paper makes use of a multi-agent representation language called HL 11, 12] details of the syntax and semantics of the language can be found in the cited references. The language is a sorted modal rst order language with sorts for events, times, uents (properties of the world that change with time), and objects. The language contains two predicates: occurs(e t) reports the occurrence of event t ype e at time t, and holds(f t) reports that uent f is true at time t time constants range over the integers and the truth of a formu l a i s g i v en relative t o s o m e w orld. An agent i's belief at time t in some is expressed as holds(Bel(i ) t ), where can be a temporal term written in one of the functional forms H o l d s ( t 0 ) o r Occurs( t 0 ) 1 . Complex event types can be constructed through operators normally found in dynamic logic. Among these are: occurs( t) ( is followed by ), occurs( t ) ( occurs zero or more times), occurs( \ t) ( b o t h and occuratt) occurs( t) ( e i - ther or occurs at t) and occurs( ? t ) (true if holds( t) is true). From these operators one can then construct expressions such as: occurs(IF THEN ELSE t) which reports the occurrence of if the condition holds and the occurrence of otherwise.
The SharedPlans theory of collaboration is used in this paper to structure negotiations. It is based on a mentalstate view of plans 6]. Rather than associating a plan for some action, , with a group of actions that can achieve , a plan is instead a rich structure consisting of a set of beliefs and intentions. 2 Intentions come in two v arieties: an intention-to perform some action represents an individual commitment on the part of an agent to perform that action, w h i l e a n i n tention-that instead represents a commitment t o some condition. The table shown in Figure 1 lists some of the other operators used in the theory.
The approach t a k en in this paper follows that described in 12] in which m e n tal actions, describing updates to beliefs and intentions, are rei ed. In this paper, these actions include update( ) for update one's beliefs with and two negotiation actions discussed in a later section. The causal relations shown in Figure 2 are part of that theory and will prove useful in the speci cation of relations between plans. 3 Agents are assumed to have access to a common library of recipes 6] that describe how tasks are decomposed. In our implementation, recipes are represented using the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) 4, 5] . Figure 3 is an example of a PRS recipe for searching an area using a particular sensor. Recipes can either describe individual or group actions. Group activities are assumed to 2 Other collaborative systems include STEAM 18] which i s based on the joint i n tentions model the latter di ers from SharedPlans in that it argues for the utility of a separate mental attitude of a joint i n tention. 3 In this paper, we view recipes as methods for action . 12] Operator Interpretation FIP An agent has a full individual plan FSP/PSP A group has a full/partial shared plan CBA An agent can bring about an act BCBA An agent believes it CBA an act MB A group mutually believe a proposition MBCBAG A group MB they CBA an act Table 1 : Operators used in SharedPlans be decomposable along a resource dimension. For example, in patrolling a corridor, the size of the area might represent one natural way of dividing that activity and a \fair" division might allocate one-half to each o f t wo agents. Certain high-level actions in a recipe might also be distinguished as representing roles: for example, a l o o k out and a patrol agent. A recipe, R , for some action, , is represented as a tree of subactions alternative instantiations of a recipe are identi ed by associating some set of constraints, .
A full shared plan (FSP) is de ned as follows. A group, GR, has a full shared plan, n, a t t i m e Tp to perform act at time T using recipe R in context C . holds(F S P (n GR T R C ) T p) holds(
1. GR has a recipe for :
There is a recipe, R i for i s.t.,
ii. G i has a full individual plan for i:
The group mutually believe (2a), 4 (c) The group is committed to G i 's success:
3. For each m ulti-agent i in R , there is a GR i GR:
(a) There is a recipe, R i for i s.t., i. GR i mutually believe they can i with R i
ii. GR i has a full SharedPlan for i using R i :
The group mutually believe (3a) (c) GR is committed to GR i 's success:
If an agent is proposing some as part of step (3a), then that proposal will be interpreted as contributing | in the way described by an appended causal relation | to FSP for . In this way, the theory of SharedPlans focuses negotiation on the most important aspects of a current plan. 4 For brevity, formalizations of (2b) and (3b) are not shown. 
NEGOTIATION SITUATIONS
The analysis of structured negotiation protocols can be simpli ed by considering progressively more complex agent types along a continuum that varies according to the degree to which each individual agent's beliefs or intentions con ict with those of another agent. First we note that the notion of full belief exchange is an idealization: if robots are equipped with sensor suites, this implies that their perceptual information stores are being updated on a continuous basis. It is unreasonable to suppose, and probably unnecessary to assume, that each individual update will be propagated among all team members on a continuous basis.
The simplest case is one in which, at any time, the agents share perfect beliefs about the world agents exchange only beliefs about their own intentions during a negotiation and there are no problems related to restricting truthful exchange of information. In this case, a negotiation terminates as soon as each agent has su cient k n o wledge of those intentions of another agent which might eliminate a proposal from consideration.
A slightly more complex situation is one in which agents also have perfect beliefs and perfect perceptual capabilities however, each agent is privy to a spatio-temporally restricted \view" of the world. This sort of situation will typically result in belief incompleteness on the part of one or more agents in this case, agents will exchange not only beliefs about intentions, but also share beliefs that will serve to update those of its team member.
More complex scenarios involve belief revision in which a n agent's beliefs can be incorrect old beliefs might be subject to correction based on inputs received from a team member. An agent's intentions might also change as a consequence of a belief revision. Such situations are much more volatile in the sense that even though agents might arrive at a consensus involving a particular task, the agreement might n o t b e justi ed if further sharing of beliefs takes place.
Finally, agents can be heterogeneous in the sense of having di erent capabilities these capabilities are manifest in their recipe libraries. In this case, even if two agents share perfect information about their respective beliefs and intentions, they still must coordinate activities that involve the specialized capabilities of a team member.
Combinations of elements from each of these can lead to further complexities: take for example a group of agents that share recipe libraries but not beliefs and, furthermore, those beliefs can be incorrect. In this paper, we will focus on combinations of the rst two cases above: we will assume that an agent's beliefs are correct and the central goal of structured negotiation will be to identify those beliefs and intentions relevant to the evolution of the current shared plan and which a team member might b e l a c king.
NEGOTIATION PROCESSES
In this section an algorithm is presented for structured negotiation. The algorithm is expressed in the language described earlier in which mental actions are rei ed. Two processes are de ned: the rst forms a proposal for some action, , and the second responds to a proposal. It is assumed that a group, consisting of agents i and j, has already been chosen and that the agents share the same preferences (from which a suitable utility function can be constructed). Preferences are expressed using an operator holds(prefer(Agent ) t ) 2]: the intuition is that, in the current circumstances (time t) Agent prefers , where the latter is usually a statement of the form Occurs(Act t 0 ) this represents a sort of action choice. For simplicity, negotiations are assumed to take place between only two agents.
In contrast to agent communication languages (ACL) based on speech a c t s , only two primitive communication actions are made use of here: send(i j Msg), referring to i 0 s communication of M s gto j and receive(i j Msg). Also, in contrast to discourse understanding systems based on SharedPlans 10], a stack is not used to record context: their is no reason to restrict arti cial agents regarding the order of negotiations. Hence, a context is simply the set of plans and intentions regarding elements of a plan. Those plans which are partial can be referred to in negotiations. Since causal relations need to specify a particular plan, this can be accomplished by appended additional descriptive information to the action description: for example, occurs( t) enables occurs( @F S P (232) t 0 ) which s a ys that performed at time t will enable the that is planned as part of FSP number 232 at time t 0 .
The algorithm for negotiation is described by two processes: propose which assumes a group of two agents, fi jg, where agent i has been made aware of some new, multiagent task, that must be performed at time T it triggers a negotiation with agent j. The process proposal is triggered at the receiving side by the other agent: it takes a proposal for and determines whether that proposal is possible from that agent's point of view. The de nition shown in Figure 4 can be glossed as follows. If agent i proposes some action which represents a division of some resource or task with agent j, then the proposal should either: (1) con rm the typical distribution of the task or resource, or (2) give reasons for a departure from the typical distribution. 5 For example, if i proposes to divide the task of patrolling a particular area in a less than even way, i should communicate a reason for doing so: for example, because of other commitments. The prevention clause corresponds to the reason for the agent's proposal. This has a strongly counterfactual avor: if represents the preventing condition, then the clause states that if the state of a airs described by had not obtained then the proposal would have been acceptable. In general, it can be di cult to choose the correct preventing condition if several conditions and actions would jointly cause some desired state (i.e., the state that would follow if the proposal were accepted). Instead of the approaches based on argumentation 1], structured negotiation focuses on causal reasons, giving preference to the following explanations: (1) any existing commitment that con icts with the proposal (the proposing agent can be assumed to have not been aware of this, otherwise it would not have proposed) (2) there is some fact 5 To simplify the presentation, the de nition only covers one round of negotiation the de nition should be embedded in a loop that backtracks over alternatives. See 13] . about the world, which the proposing agent is unaware of, which prevents the proposed action and (3) the agent is physically unable to contribute in the way in which the proposer suggests. In an agent receives a message that some condition, , is preventing a plan, then a set of interpretation rules is invoked which corrects the knowledge base (since was highlighted because it represented a departure from the norm. See 13].). Actions that are recommended through the computation of preferences (which include individual and group preferences calculated with the prefer operator) can be either speci c or general. In the former case, an agent might, for example, propose to patrol area(A :25) which could be taken to mean \1/4 of corridor A." In the latter case the agent might propose to patrol area(A :25) and perform a helping(i ) act-type, where helping(i ) is any act-type performed by agent i that helps in the performance of .
The process proposal activity is de ned for action using recipe R and under constraints as follows (to simplify, some of the arguments to intentions are not shown). (Due to lack of space the last two steps are not shown. The helping term is just an abbreviation for the help causal relation, involving instead an agent and an act.) Consider the example discussed earlier. Embeddings are implicit in the expressed dependencies between actions that are part of FSPs. Exchanges (4) and (6) can be understood as a departure from the norm and explained by the clause referring to prior commitment. prevents Occurs( t) THEN newid = y send(i j int:th(F S P (y fi jg helping(j )))) t ) update context and mental state as in process When a proposal is processed by an agent, that agent might infer additional information not explicitly transmitted. This additional information corresponds loosely to the notion of perlocutionary force in speech act theory: it represents a side-e ect to the communication. Messages between agents are of the form: int:th(Agent Formula). The formula appearing in the scope of the intention-that message usually refers to a collaborative p l a n t o ward some activity. If the agent wishes to transmit additional supporting information, then a conjunction of formulas is transmitted supporting information takes the form of expressions of causal dependencies between elements of a shared plan (these elements can include beliefs for example, lack o f k n o wledge as to some might be preventing completion of a particular plan). In contrast to speech act theory, the set of possible illocutions is not closed under this scheme: the interpretation of a message depends on the prevailing context.
COMMUNICATION IN SITU occurs(process proposal(i int:th(j FSP(n G t R ))) t ) occurs( if there is something physically preventing, inform IF 9 :Holds( t) Prevents H o l d s (C B A (i R t ) t ) THEN send(i j holds( t) prevents holds(C B A (i R t ) t ) else, if can
In the processes described earlier, helpful behavior is embedded in the process de nitions. In a fully eshed-out theory, such b e h a viors would represent outcomes of intermediate inferences. For example, rather than communicating a preventing condition immediately, the system should infer that the other agent probably is not aware of that information and telling it would \help" that agent. Axioms that capture such c hains of reasoning are straightforward to dene in the representation described.
IMPLEMENTATION
The example shown in Figure 1 consists of what we will refer to as \cover" and \point" agents these appear at the bottom of the map and will negotiate a patrolling pattern within the discrete and uncertain simulation domain. A series of process locks ensures that any simulation action (including deliberation) will take a xed amount of time, eliminating experimental variables such as processor speed and thread priority. Uncertainty dictates that each agent must maintain its own, possibly incomplete, map the illustration shows a ground-truth \world view" that is not necessarily accessible to any of the agents. Figure 6 traces this process as the \cover" agent takes on a larger patrol due to negotiation with the \point" agent. The middle window shows an initiating message from the command center, instructing cover to join point in patrolling an area delimited by six waypoints.
The top window depicts cover's half of the planning process, which begins with the selection of a recipe for joint patrols. The recipe is an abstract plan template which m ust be elaborated, as shown in the next entry. At rst this is done using the default elaboration: an equal division of the patrol area. The next step, reconciling, determines whether the tentative plan is compatible with cover's current i n tentions and actions. In the example, this step fails for the point agent, and it negotiates a n e w proposal. In the next line, cover can be seen reconciling this new and unequal proposal with its own constraints. The bottom line shows that the plan is acceptable point receives the con rmation message shown in the bottom window.
The scenario presented earlier in Figure 1 characterizes an experimental domain in which w e use structured negotiation as a high-level controller for autonomous vehicles. Small rovers and helicopters each run their own identical implementations, which listen for high-level mission orders to search particular areas or pursue targets. We h a ve tested these in both simulations of the form shown in 1 and with actual physical robots. we discuss only the former work in this paper. The controllers then make use of the methods spelled out below t o a r r i v e at consensus on a team recipe for ful lling the mission, and on who will be responsible for each part of the strategy. Our implementation interfaces with PRS which maintains the agents beliefs in inference-capable databases that can be consulted against plan constraints, and provides the messaging infrastructure for receiving orders and negotiating. It also handles perception-triggered belief updates, and the dispatch of plans to lower-level actuators. We h a ve added a language for representing hierarchical, potentially partial plans based on the SharedPlans formalism already presented. These form the structures over which the agents negotiate, making use of the following procedures, based on the theory of structured negotiation, implemented to minimize message size and frequency DEFAULT-SELECTION On receiving a mission or plan, select the pre-arranged default recipe or elaboration, respectively. Reconcile that selection with your knowledge base, identifying any con icting beliefs. If there is any grounds for deviating, notify collaborators by sending them the justifying beliefs. Signify assent b y sending an empty list. On receiving a (potentially empty) list from all agents, compile the union 6 of all justi cations and assume the pre-arranged default selection determined by the revised information.
DISCREPANCY-INFERENCE On receiving a proposal that is inconsistent w i t h y our knowledge base, signal your dissent b y retaining the contradictory belief and sending it to the proposing agent. Make no other e ort to synchronize beliefs. On receiving such a message, reconcile the belief with your knowledge base.
CONSTRAINT-IMPLICATION When updated information necessitates a modi ed plan proposal, send collaborators the new facts before doing any re-planning. On receiving such a message, interpret it as a new proposal over the set of plans enabled by the new information.
ABSTRACT-REFERENCE When soliciting assistance in performing particular actions, refer to them directly by the most speci c sub-task they serve. If your most recent correspondence concerns that sub-task, no identi er is necessary at all.
HIERARCHICAL-ORDERING Order above activities by negotiating over increasingly speci c sub-plans.
Evaluation
The e ciencies provided by pre-deploying common structures among collaborating agents are intuitive, but di cult to compare with the set of all unstructured approaches. Because most could be considered a form of encoding, any conclusions should be general enough to preclude the particulars of our message compression functions. Hence, this section will rst describe the savings provided by e a c h algorithm in abstract terms, before presenting an example of their occurrence in our vehicle coordination system. Then, we will formalize the bandwidth savings in terms of number of messages transmitted as well as number of facts or referents transmitted in those messages. T h e l a t t e r i s i n tended as a general measure of message length a fact is a single proposition from an agents knowledge base, and a referent is either a plan, sub-plan, or action that an agent refers to in its message. Instead of basing such s a vings on compar- 6 The method for resolving potentially con icting reports should be determined by the domain requirements. Our method is to believe a statement o ver its negation if we h e a r it from more agents than its negation. We do not use inference to check for implied inconsistencies. Default Selection  6  6  Discrepancy Inference 7  13  Constraint Implication 0  6  Abstract Reference  0  42  Total  13  67   Table 3 : Conservation of Message Bandwidth ison with some arbitrarily selected or mock non-structured approaches, our evaluation will identify a single key feature such that the savings described hold over any method that lacks that feature. Only in this context will we nally list empirical results from running structured negotiation in our unmanned vehicle domain, summarized in Table 3 . Such results were derived by running three vehicle agents, each using a structured negotiation controller, over ten di erent scenarios wherein they received an order to jointly patrol a speci c area. By varying the agents capabilities, their knowledge of each others capabilities, and unexpected events in the domain, we w ere able to induce all of the above algorithms to come into play. Over all our system used a total of 28 messages per agent during the ten runs, containing an average of 1.18 facts or referents per message. Without structured negotiation, the runs would have required 41 messages, each containing 2.4 facts or referents, if they were to use the alternative methods described below.
Msgs Saved Decreased Length
Default Selection. Because the agents are cooperative, they can predetermine default responses to various proposals, and further predetermine their responses given a speci c set of relevant beliefs in their knowledge base. Thus agents do not need to communicate when there are no extenuating circumstances, and when there are, they need only compile the circumstances and know that everyone will arrive at the same conclusion based on that information. For instance, in one of the runs all agents were equally capable of traversing all regions of the patrol area, and believed this to be true of each other. Hence, they each took a pre-determined equal division and did not need to send a single message. In general, the use of defaults saves a single message each time an agent a voids proposing the allocation that has been chosen as the default. When there are extenuating circumstances, the agent spends a message to communicate them, but needs no more communication after that and hence is no worse than a method that does not use defaults. In the experiments six messages were saved in this way (and hence six referents, or units of message length.)
Discrepancy Inference. Depending on the domain, it is at best ine cient and at worst infeasible to synchronize agents beliefs at all times. However, any discrepancies relevant to the success of a particular proposal must be brought forward during negotiation. Using this method, when an agent knows something its partner doesn't it waits to receive a n u n workable proposal, and infers that the proposing agent must be missing this knowledge. If such a circumstance does not arise, there is no need to resolve a given discrepancy. For instance, in the scenario played out in Figure 1, R4 infers from R1's initial proposal that R1 is unaware of its commitment to patrol another corridor. This con rms the discrepancy's relevance, and R4 encodes the con ict by communicating the fact that it is committed. In general, the savings over perpetual database reconciliation is boundless if every possible fact is to be synchronized. In interests of fairness, in our experiments we considered a system where recipes are tagged with relevant factors or preconditions, and only beliefs referring to such considerations were updated whenever they were discussed. Usually this meant an update of two or so facts concerning fuel level, the presence of obstacles, and vehicle capabilities. In comparison, structured negotiation was able to save a total of 7 messages through discrepancy inference, and 13 referents.
Constraint Implication. Should an agent acquire new information necessitating re-negotiation, it need not counterpropose a series of possible arrangements satisfying the new constraint. Rather, it refers to the entire set of such n e w proposals by simply communicating the new information. Combined with default selection, this provides a well-de ned and completely determined set of alternatives, ensuring that such r e f e r e n tial economy will still be uniformly interpreted.
In certain experimental scenarios, a vehicle would become immobilized by an unexpected calamity, and in announcing as much i t w ould be simultaneously proposing the set of task allocations where it would not need to move. In general, the savings are bounded only be the number of alternative plans supported by the domain. In our domain this number was 4 in all relevant runs, of which there were two. Hence, constraint implication was able to save 6 referents over the course of the experiments. It is more di cult to quantify a second bene t of this method. Speci cally, the agent can interleave planning with action by transmitting the new information before it has computed the set of new proposals. The greater the complexity o f s u c h computation in a particular domain, the greater the savings in speed a orded by this advantage.
Abstract Reference. Because the agents are deployed with or otherwise develop common recipes, they can refer directly to speci c portions of the plan template without listing a chain of hierarchical tasks. This keeps messages concise, for instance when an agent asks for help with a particular sub-task. In some of the scenarios, a ground vehicle was able to ask a helicopter to perform a particular task in support of a series of higher-level tasks, without having to explicitly name each higher-level task in the chain. In general, this saves in message length over negotiation methods that either do not assume common plan templates, or do not structure their negotiations at all, instead sequencing sets of primitive actions. The latter case is not so unfair a comparison, give the insulation of many negotiation methods from multi-agent planning. For the sake of experiment, though, we compared structured negotiation with the former approach, where the savings would not be so extreme. Using this model, the savings in message length depends on the average depth of plan decomposition where an agent might refer to its activities. In our experiments this was usually seven levels, so the agents saved six referents whenever they asked for help. This happened seven times, for a total savings of 42 referents.
Hierarchical Ordering. The nal feature of structured negotiation does not save in message number or size, but forms the basis of our system's anytime properties. Because the agents are negotiating over action sequences overlaid by a hierarchical structure, they can rst focus on the most general tasks at hand. Hence, in case they have run out of time for deliberation or communication fails, they are still able to further elaborate their assigned high-level tasks and attempt them on their own without consensus. We w ere not able to simulate such conditions in our experiments, but were able to observe the top-down ordering of negotiations.
SUMMARY AND RELATED WORK
This paper has introduced a new form of negotiation targeted towards collaborative teams. Structured negotiation has the desirable property of e ciency of communication and incrementality. The latter is made possible through a structuring of negotiation and an interleaving with shared planning. We a n ticipate that this will also have useful applications for systems which must explain their actions to users however, our focus so far has been strictly on automated negotiation among arti cial agents.
The body of work in automated negotiation among selfinterested agents has become quite large 14, 15, 8] . Research in negotiation in collaborative setting has been more limited. There are several areas of research that were very in uential in the development of structured negotiation: discourse models 10], studies of negotiation in natural language discourse 16] and formal languages for argumentation in negotiation 7]. Work on natural language negotiation di ers from structured negotiation in its focus on negotiations that are prompted by questions of resource-boundedness. For example, one agent might propose, \Let's do A because A enables B and because we w ant t o a c hieve B," in a setting in which the hearer had not expended su cient computational resources to be aware of the enablement condition. In structured negotiation, agents are assumed to share the same preferences and are assumed to be able to derive s u c h inferences the focus is instead on identifying incorrect beliefs that might be in the way of allowing one agent to collaborate with another.
The work on formal argumentation is similar in its use of a representation that refers to an agent's mental state to, for example, express threats or communicate consequences of proposed actions. Many of the examples focus on selfinterested agents however, such an approach could be adapted to support the sort of negotiations described in this paper. 7] More recent w ork explores the use of argumentation in the context of a teamwork model 19] . The major contribution of structured negotiation, as compared to these alternatives, is its organizational and inferential elements, where the latter involves the use of causal annotations and the former exploits the structure of a shared plan.
One most commonly nds agent communication languages 17] that are based on speech act theory 9]. Typically, some closed set of speech acts is de ned which corresponds to communication act types such a s inform, request, o r warning actions the de nitions of speech acts are usually expressed in terms of the changes in mental state that they bring about. Some in the discourse community h a ve argued against such a n a p p r o a c h o n t wo counts: (1) the same speech act can have di erent i n terpretations (bring about di erent e ects) in di erent contexts and (2) a sort of master-slave relationship is implicitly introduced by virtue of the assumption that a speech act necessarily brings about a change in the intentions of the hearer 10]. The latter can be an unwelcome introduction to collaborative interactions. The approach t a k en to communication in structured negotiation is parsimonious and avoids the potential problem of later having to de ne new types of speech acts.
Very little work has been done in interleaving planning and negotiation. Notable in this respect is the work of Ephrati and Rosenschein 3] which examines subplan aggregation through the use of consensus mechanisms. In contrast, the work described in this paper takes at its starting point a richer notion of plans 6].
